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My Friend Ilan Gur Ze’ev 
‘is the friend the same or the other?’(Derrida, 2005, 4). 
 
My friend Ilan stood bravely as a modern voice of private property. I intend for the meaning 
of this sentence not to be self-evident. Ilan was not an apologist for private property. Far from 
it. Nor was he a dogmatic opponent of private property, someone who simply called for its 
abolition regardless of the self-evident contradictions that underpin varieties of such 
assertions. Instead Ilan was the voice of the knots in which private property entangles those 
who dare to question it, and to question its effects on life lived around the globe. Those 
readers who know Ilan’s work well might say that it was rare for Ilan to write directly about 
private property. But this is not the point. One does not have to write about private property 
to be the voice of private property and of its critique. One need only speak at all to be always 
already the voice of private property. And if one speaks against both injustice in general and 
against the injustice of one’s own position in the world relative to those who have less, one is 
always already the ambivalent voice of the (self-)critique of private property. 
I first met Ilan at New College, Oxford in 1998 where he was giving a paper on Kierkegaard. 
Immediately – and such moments are rare and unforgettable – I heard a voice  which clearly 
suffered from the totality of its own conditions of possibility, but which was neither cynical 
nor ironic nor intriguing in speaking this. I recognized this to be an honest voice, honest 
about the preconditions that compromised it. There were, here, two sets of content being 
presented at the same time: the content on Kierkegaard, and the philosophically and 
politically shaped experience of the content.  I could hear the difficulty of Ilan trying to do 
justice to the justice and injustice that pertain to the voice that speaks of justice. I found in 
Ilan the difficulty of being the voice of private property which so many others avoid either 
naïvely or wilfully. This difficulty, I think, never left Ilan. It was the integrity of his 
subjectivity that I heard whenever I was with him, something which I miss so much now. 
Ilan has left for us a phenomenology, a set of contradictory experiences, which formed his 
own educational journey – I am tempted to write ‘intellectual’ journey, but it would be a 
mistake to think that this meant a vita contemplativa somehow divorced from a vita activa, or 
where thinking was separated from the emotional, aesthetic and spiritual. Ilan lived his 
rational self-critique passionately, lovingly, angrily, beautifully, comically and tragically. 
Those who insist on holding reason and emotion apart will not understand who Ilan was. 
Indeed, it is within the relationship of their opposition to each other that reason and emotion 
challenge not just the identity thinking that holds them apart, but also the private property 
relations on which these identities, and others, are grounded. The emotion of the rational 
contradiction – embodied in Ilan – stands as a critique of those who, as merely uncritical 
voices of reason as property, assert that reason is only cold, calculating and clinical. To be the 
self-critical voice of private property is to refuse it the stability and identity it craves and 
which is its major power and influence in the world. This means that Ilan was not just the 
voice of private property. He was the subjectivity and the substance of the self-critique of the 
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individual property-owning ‘person’. The ‘person’ here is legally his own person – the bearer 
of his own rights and the owner of his own property – and ‘we’ are all such persons. But the 
life of Ilan was the life of the person who learns of the injustice that is embodied in being just 
such a person, and who then lives out a life and death struggle with that person, a life and 
death struggle for integrity, for its soul. Those who remain merely persons are those who are 
resistant to becoming resistant to this person. 
To study Ilan’s thinking, then, is to follow this life-and-death struggle – at once physical, 
spiritual, emotional and intellectual – tracing within it a series of developments which form 
themselves into one of social and political critique within the conditions of private property 
law which are always its condition of possibility. His thinking is a critique which carries this 
ambivalence. Knowing that it carries this ambivalence gives it the form and content of the 
man Ilan Gur Ze’ev. I will trace this man, this education, now, through four of his most 
important and inter-related ideas: counter-education, diasporic philosophy, improvisation, 
and the new anti-Semitism. Behind each of these there is an eternal vigilance against the 
trappings, the seductions, and the rewards, of the realm of the ‘self-evident’. 
 
Counter-education 
The first thing I read of Ilan’s was his paper ‘Toward a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy’ 
(Gur Ze’ev, 1998). This paper begins ‘For all their differences, all current versions of critical 
pedagogy function as part and parcel of normalizing education and its violence’(1998, 463). 
This constituted only the beginning of what was to become one of the most serious 
challenges to critical pedagogy from within critical pedagogy, from one for whom ‘critical 
pedagogy and the possibility of counter-education are tremendously meaningful’ (Gur Ze’ev, 
2010, 1). His own notion of counter-education ran counter to the education in which the 
economic system of injustice and inequality practiced its own reproduction, within the 
powerful ideological guise of being the normal, the taken-for-granted, or the self-evident. But 
it also ran counter to the underlying utopian tyrannies of all projects, including critical 
pedagogy, which dogmatically justified their own authority within and by the violence of 
their own uncritical ‘self-evidence’ (1998, 463). This self-evidence refers, in part, to the 
utopian visions of emancipatory projects, and to the simplistic idea that the ends justify the 
means. For Ilan these simply replaced one tyranny by another. Twelve years later he would 
reiterate this: ‘critical pedagogy itself becomes dogmatized and transformed into an 
oppressive tool, even against those proclaimed to be emancipated by the critical 
educators’(2010, 194). So many of my friends in critical pedagogy, he said, ‘do not wrestle 
with [the] self-critique’ (1998, 203) needed if this reproduction of tyranny is to be 
interrupted. 
The main criticism that Ilan had of critical pedagogy, as of other emancipatory dogmas, was 
its removal of itself from the difficulties of negating its own critique of power, adopting 
instead the remedy of positive utopianism. Here Ilan was influenced greatly by what he called 
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the second stage of critical theory, particularly that of Horkheimer and Adorno. I quote here 
from the opening paragraph of this 1998 piece. 
 
Counter-education opens possibilities for refusing to abandon human potential to 
become other than directed by the system and the realm of self-evidence. It enables a 
chance – which is to be struggled for again and again – to challenge normalizing 
education in all its versions, including critical pedagogy… Philosophical negativism, 
I argue, is a precondition for the development of nonrepressive critical pedagogy… 
Current versions of critical pedagogy lack this negative dimension; all are united by 
a commitment to positive utopianism, even when explicitly denying it. (1998, 463) 
 
From the Frankfurt School he took the need for a transcendental dimension tied to the 
potential that is suppressed in existing realities. It enabled him to work with the idea of the 
totally other, something which becomes increasingly important for him over the next fifteen 
years. It is the lack of transcendence and the refusal of its totally other which led early critical 
pedagogy, including in Freire, to adopt a ‘noncritical and automatic preference for the self-
evident knowledge of the oppressed’(1998, 469). Behind Ilan’s comment here I find a 
critique of the idea that the teacher must renounce his or her authority if education is to be 
either fair – i.e. equal between teacher and student – or emancipatory – where the teacher’s 
authority will melt into air within the truth that will emerge from the newly forming culture. 
For Ilan, such yearnings regarding the nature of the teacher and of political education merely 
repeated ‘the self-evidence of the group and earthly politics’(1998, 469). Non-transcendence 
‘opens the gates to totalitarianism as earthly heaven’(1998, 469). These positive utopias 
justified themselves within ‘the self-evidence of the group’(1998, 469) or the self-evidence of 
‘the leader-educator’(1998, 469). In both cases, for Ilan the group and the teacher were not 
being critical enough. They would be sufficiently critical when their self-critique could speak 
of itself only negatively, and in a space opened in transcendence. For Ilan, it was important 
that the vita activa work with the vita contemplativa or, in shorthand, that practice not be 
alienated from theory, and certainly not refused it. For Ilan, this praxis embodied a ‘negative 
utopianism’ (1998, 476) which demanded ‘transcendence from the current realm of self-
evidence’(1998, 476). 
If Ilan’s critique of Freire spoke of the theme of transcendence which would occupy Ilan 
thereafter, his critique of Giroux announced another related theme that Ilan became 
increasingly concerned about in the years before his death. When Giroux , moving from 
revolutionary worker to cultural worker, made ‘difference’ (1998, 475) the grounding of 
critical pedagogy, for Ilan it marked a refusal of deep self-critique. It guaranteed that such 
critical pedagogy ‘will not contemplate deeply and problematize the roots of existence and 
coexistence and question the possibilities of reality but will realize [again] its potential for 
philosophical violence and political terror’(1998, 475). But, additionally, Giroux ‘ignores 
critical theory’s exposition of the systematic destruction of the individual’s potential for 
autonomy and reflectivity and neglects critical theory’s exposition of the disappearance of 
spirit and the exile of reason’(1998, 475). This idea of exile, and of the exile of spirit in 
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particular, was to become a very powerful part of Ilan’s critique of post-modern and post-
structural contributions to educational theory. 
On the post-modern community of educational theorists Ilan says ‘they all refuse philosophy 
and anything that hints of a “theory” or “elitism.” This is the background to their political and 
educational impotence, which leads to nothing but empty negativism and fruitless pessimism’ 
(1998, 475-6). Again, I read this to be a critique by Ilan of the refusal of the very structure of 
education and teaching, a refusal to accept that some things are important enough to be taught 
and learned about by all. This is the same refusal which connives with the violence of the 
self-evident, and with normalizing practices. It is, in effect, a refusal of education itself or, if 
you prefer, a refusal of the kind of education that presupposes that one person has the 
educational authority to teach another things that fall outside of the mistaken idea of an 
‘organically’ generated realm of the self-evident. For Ilan this was a refusal of the challenges 
of theory and of its contradictions, a refusal which took refuge in the violence of the self-
evident. This obviously goes to the heart of a major controversy in education, namely, should 
the oppressed be taught by themselves alone, or in cooperation with other oppressed groups, 
or should they be taught by intellectuals (often seen as a vanguard), or by a combination of all 
three? Perhaps for Ilan it was just another oppression of the oppressed to refuse them the 
canon by asserting that they must teach themselves.  
Ilan challenged critical pedagogy to reform itself in line with the change that Horkheimer 
announced in regard to critical theory. The first stage of critical theory had been characterized 
by positive utopianism. The second stage presented ‘an explicit anti-revolutionary 
strand’(1998, 476) against the way revolution had itself become an oppressor of the 
oppressed. Citing in particular the dialectic of enlightenment Ilan argued that the 
instrumentalization of reason is irreversible. Moreover, all solutions to the problems of this 
totality cannot avoid becoming instrumental. This is where myth becomes enlightenment and 
enlightenment returns to myth. Nevertheless, there is an ontological significance here, not 
least in the ahistorical Godly or redemptive sphere, for which history, and its instrumental 
totality, is just one of its moments. Justice here is ‘basically a theological category’(1998, 
478) and is the starting point for a critical pedagogy that is not dogmatic and hastily 
optimistic’(1998, 478). Of course, for some of Ilan’s critical colleagues around the world, the 
theological sphere itself is just such a dogma. For Ilan, however, the antinomy that bedevilled 
critical pedagogy, that of a positive anti-metanarrative, was the road to transcendence, and to 
a necessary humility in regard to the earthly solutions to problems. Its real danger was that 
the earthly solutions to the antinomy of solutions elicits ‘violence’ under the authority of 
‘collectivist and positive’(1998, 478) utopianism. Within the critical pedagogy of Freire, 
Giroux and, says Ilan, certain versions of feminist pedagogy, the dialectic of authority, or of 
enlightenment, makes commitment to solidarity based on identity both mythical and violent. 
‘None of these three models of critical pedagogy has succeeded in synthesizing the 
problematics of essentialism, foundationalism, and transcendence, as well as the recognition 
of the “others” suffering, rights and potentialities, with the precondition of a philosophy 
demanding human reflexivity and emancipation. All three versions lack critical theory, while 
neglecting the price of this disregard’(1998, 479). 
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One of the things that made Ilan distinct within the names that populate critical pedagogy was 
that, ever since I knew him, he was prepared to work with the aporetic and, for him, objective 
truth that under the conditions of the total instrumentalization of reason, ‘it is impossible to 
escape the omnipotence of the system’(1998, 479). As such, consensus of the identity of 
participants in a dialogue – Freirean, cultural, or feminist – ‘is naïve’ (1998, 480). The 
implication of this is as powerful as it is uncomfortable: ‘marginalized and repressed self-
evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the 
oppressors’(1998, 480). The prejudice in favour of the former ‘cannot avoid vulgar realism 
and naïve positivism based on the “facts” of the self-evident knowledge, ultimately realized 
against the self-evidence of other groups’(1998, 480). This observation, I think, marks out 
Ilan as the objective ambivalent voice of private property and its self-critique. The 
heteronomy of the identity of each oppressed identity, even in being ‘open’ to the truths of all 
heteronomous oppressed identities, is nevertheless based on the self-evidence of private 
property relations. Herein the victory of each critical pedagogy is secured not over the 
system, but over other similarly oppressed identities within the self-evident world of private 
property.  
In response to each of these violences, wherever he found them, it was Ilan’s vocation to 
remind us that behind the heteronomous identities of different identities, behind difference 
itself, lay the unthinkable homogeneity of the human. This humanity should not be deferred 
either in the name of fragmentation, or by those strategies which reify uncertainty. Instead, 
for Ilan, it should be expressed negatively as transcendence, which meant expressed as 
homelessness. In the 1998 article he stated that critical pedagogy needed to ‘present itself as 
an elaboration of the possibility of an alternative spirituality and as part of an effort to 
transcend reality and the present realm of self-evidence’(1998, 481). In the final analysis, 
Ilan’s counter-education grounded in the second stage of critical theory, ‘implies a negative 
utopianism, in which the only possible appearance of justice is in the presence of its absence, 
in the acknowledgement of the violence of its negation’(1998, 482). In the totality of private 
property there is only resistance, and more resistance, against the self-evidence of private 
property which itself resists the capacity to resist. This includes the way the self-evident 
seduces resistance into positions that are not resistant, and from which identities are allowed 
to believe themselves organic, natural constituencies. As such, believing it to be self-
evidently otherwise, these groups, these identities, therein become resistant to resistance – 
they seek only to affirm themselves. Counter-education, says Ilan, has no ‘counter-
poison’(1998, 485). It has ‘no positive and evident alternative to false consciousness, such as 
“the memory” or “the knowledge” of women, minorities, or the marginalized and 
oppressed’(1998, 485). What makes counter-education different, and very much also the 
same, is that ‘it does not accept reality as having the last word’(1998, 485). 
Counter-education is therefore an invitation to live with the dialectic of enlightenment of 
resistance to the self-evident. Resistance is already enlightenment, and enlightenment returns 
to be resisted. It was with pain that Ilan acknowledged that critical reason and human 
solidarity contradict each other within present conditions of private property relations. This 
same pain recognized that ‘a nonrepressive critical pedagogy might be realized only for 
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isolated individuals and cannot become a matter of collectives’(1998, 486). As such, the 
realm of the self-evident labels this not only pessimistic, fatalistic, and resigned, but it also 
calls it elitist. Nevertheless, resistance to the self-evident requires that this elitism continue to 
resist all elitism, whether that be of the critical theorists, the teacher, or of the ‘ethnocentrism 
of the oppressed’(1998, 486) which is the act of an elite who reify the oppressed. Ilan’s 
conclusion to the work of resistance required in the world is that ‘critique is in this sense a 
prayer that cannot change the world, but allows transcendence from it. This is the only 
nonrepressive form of hope possible in such an educational project’(1998, 486). 
I now turn to the three ideas by which Ilan took up the challenge of this prayer. These are the 
ideas of diaspora as the negative life, improvisation, and the new anti-Semitism which for 
Ilan underpinned recent anti-metanarrative philosophies. 
 
Diaspora 
It is well-known, perhaps, that Ilan formed his critical pedagogy workshops to bring together 
interested parties in the search for a new critical language in education. But in some ways 
Ilan was the only contributor who seemed either to have or to see the possibility of a new 
critical language. What he really invited us to do was to respond to the challenges he had set 
us. If we were interested in critical pedagogy then how do we deal with his powerful 
accusations that critical pedagogy really only managed to repeat the violence of the self-
evident by claiming that its standpoint, its version of education, was self-evidently necessary?  
At the heart of the meetings the question he set us was, how do we explore our complicity 
within the self-evident? In what emerged it became clear that few, if any, of the attendees 
cared to explore such questions. Each of us had our own self-evidently necessary work to 
occupy us, and self-evidently this did not require us to have to join Ilan on his solipsistic 
quest for negative nomadic existence. A new critical language was offered, but refused. A 
new immersion in aporia was offered, but declined. Everyone went on their way as self-
evidently themselves as they had been when they arrived, as self-evidently important as they 
knew themselves to be, and as self-evidently justified in doing what they did in the ways in 
which they did it. Reading the two books that emerged from these meetings (Gur Ze’ev 2005 
& 2010) it is clear that very few of the contributors joined in a dialogue with Ilan at all. I note 
that he had grown weary of these meetings by about 2010, and he spoke to me of his 
disappointment with them. Few it seemed in critical pedagogy were prepared to join him in 
the negative prayer of critique by facing up to the aporias of their own theories and their own 
practices. 
Ilan, nevertheless, opened his edited collections up to all of the perspectives and the theorists 
that he disagreed with. At times I think his openness to these perspectives led him to import 
concepts into his own work which were not really compatible with it. As I note below, he 
also became increasingly suspicious of many of these fashionable academic trends. 
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In 2008, the invitation from Ilan at the workshop was to reflect on diasporic existence. He 
conceived this as a resistance to the totality of the self-evident, of instrumental reason, of 
commodity fetishism, and, I would add, to all forms of critical thinking which were 
subsumed under the self-evident world of private property. It was an invitation to ‘rethink 
ourselves’(2010, 1) and to walk out into ‘new forms of homelessness and diasporic 
existence’(2010, 1). The invitation was not to ‘redeem’ critical pedagogy (2010, 2). More 
bluntly still, ‘this meeting is not an invitation to a new attempt to sail for the still 
undiscovered shores of integration of the current most fashionable academic cultural 
commodities with the traditional ethos of critical education: I oppose these attempts, as 
prescribed at their best by some of our friends participating in today’s Oxford critical 
dialogue here at New College’ (2010, 2). There were to be no hiding places. Many in the 
room who had been invited were, for Ilan, part of the recurring problem of violence in critical 
pedagogy and its associated activities. We were challenged by Ilan ‘to offer courageous 
replies to aporia’(2010, 4) which did not include ‘the joy of being celebrities, being cited, 
interviewed or looked upon in admiration’(2010, 4). We were challenged ‘to overcome the 
rhetoric of “solutions”’ (2010, 4). And we were reminded that ‘the new language has not yet 
honoured us with its blessed presence’(2010, 5). Nevertheless, he asked, have we ‘genuinely 
tried to overcome the language of “emancipatory education”, and open ourselves to the 
essence of the saying of the aporia of our era?’ (2010, 6) 
Diasporic philosophy for Ilan was part of the second stage of critical theory. It had no 
beginning, and importantly no end. In this sense it was resistance without an end.1 It loved 
life, and never settled for a security or an identity that would be less than life. In this sense, 
diasporic philosophy resembled the importance of movement in the ancient world, where for 
Socrates, that which is stationary stagnates and dies. For Ilan, never being at home was a way 
of saying never settle with the self-evident, and always refuse all identity thinking. As such, 
diasporic philosophy ‘insists on consistent negativity as a form of life’(2010, 27). And in an 
expression which reminds one of the way the Hegelian Aufhebung both negates and 
preserves, Ilan says ‘diasporic life here questions, deconstructs, subverts, yet preserves, 
accepts and transcends’(2010, 32). For Ilan it commends ‘an alternative kind of ethics’(2010, 
33), a response-ability for leaving home and risking exile from the truths of the self-evident. 
With Horkheimer, this became not a struggle for revolution but for the spiritual individual. 
Freire’s work, for example, was ‘anti-diasporic’ (2010, 44) because it was ‘committed to 
establishing a “homecoming” project for the oppressed’(2010, 44). Freire and other leading 
critical pedagogues including McLaren and Giroux, did not inform their thinking with the 
diasporic anti-foundationalism aspects of critical theory. As such, for Ilan, ‘a philosopher 
worthy of the name must become what I call “a diasporic human being”’ (2010, 51).  
As genuine diasporic philosophers both Adorno and Horkheimer refuse any 
philosophy that leads to consensus, synthesis, and the end of dialectics and worthy 
suffering. Yet at the same time they refuse to abandon the quest for the Messiah or 
human emancipation. The quest, as a Messianic tension, is central here, not its 
‘successful’ fulfilment. (2010, 53) 
                                                          
1 See Howard Caygill, (2013) On Resistance, London, Bloomsbury. 
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Ilan cited Adorno who argued that Judaism is the symbol of the powerless. For Ilan this 
second stage of critical theory offered critical theory as a ‘Jewish Negative Theology ’(2010, 
54). It turns ‘praxis into prayer’ (2010, 57). ‘In prayer, the yearning for a dialogue between 
the human as an infinite challenge to her finitude and “God” as a representation of Infinity is 
realised. Intimacy with holiness is re-established. The relation is a religious one… A self-
contained, domesticated, human subject cannot make possible the true human, since he is 
essentially Diasporic when true to himself’ (2010, 57). One must be vigilant against the 
instrumentalization of love and prayer, against their becoming slaves to the reality they are 
committed to transcend. 
 
Improvisation 
It is perhaps not surprising that Ilan turned to an idea such as improvisation to find a way that 
expressed how one could live and love as diaspora and counter-education. In an essay on the 
ambivalence of ‘peace education’ Ilan employed improvisation as a counter to the under-
theorised presuppositions of violence that were part of a normalised idea of peace education.  
The latter, he said, as yet has no historical consciousness. More worryingly, he believed that 
present versions of peace education were actually a threat to ‘free, anti-dogmatic, creative 
and erotic humans’ (2010, 64). Peace is seldom examined in relation to its own violence, and 
this means it can sometimes be a ‘naïve agent’ (2010, 65) of the violence it contests. Here 
again Ilan takes seriously the unavoidable complicity of an idea with the conditions of its 
possibility, specifically the complicity of peace with the normal when it is enacted as a 
political action opposing the normal. This ambivalence, he says, sees violence ‘have the 
upper hand in the form of “peace” and “normality”  that makes possible the invisibility of 
normalizing violence’ (2010, 70). Note too that Ilan’s anger comes through here, specifically 
against the proponents of resistance and struggle for a peaceful future who live in ‘the 
academic ivory towers or in million-dollar roomy-tranquil apartments on prosperous suburbs’ 
(2010, 71). 
The question then, is how might peace education relate differently to the violence that is often 
propounded on the path toward harmony and peace? The problem lies in the manner in which 
peace education does not make of itself its own problem. For example, the way in which 
peace education is ‘very much influenced’ (2010, 76) by the Enlightenment vision of a future 
perfect world.  Notably here he turns to Rosenzweig to find a Messianism that refuses any 
vision of a future peace of positive utopia.  
To this ambivalence of peace education Ilan offers improvisation as a work of eternal 
diaspora, a co-poiesis that might open the gate to ‘an alternative for present peace education’ 
(2010, 78). Just as Ilan is a critic of the violence of private property from within this violence 
of private property, so, he believed peace education on earth, and even in diasporic life, is 
never peaceful. As such he states ‘The absence of “peace” and the overcoming of the illusion 
of peace is the birth moment of an alternative togetherness as offered by responsible 
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improvisation’ (2010, 79). This co-poietic improvisation serves what is not-yet or is potential 
in a life of love, and in an idea of hospitality. This hospitality will be improvised because it is 
not ruled by pre-determined demands, but as rather a ‘participation for the Otherness of the 
Other as a friend, as a companion, as a worthy rival, as an unanswered question, as an 
indispensable manifestation of the entire cosmos and its holiness’ (2010, 79). This 
responsible improvisation is thus an alternative to the peace education that exists only as 
‘hegemonic normalizing education’ (2010, 80).  
In short, improvisation as peace education is precisely the absence of tranquillity, for it is a 
creative act of birth-giving. If improvisation here is a way of life practising the ability to 
respond to the other in ways which are deemed self-creating, then this is the same response-
ability I always found in my meetings and conversations with Ilan. It is the practice of 
counter-education lived in and as human relations, and it is, he concludes, more ‘fundamental 
and responsible’ (2010, 83) even than the peace of peace education. 
Ilan also turned once again to the nature of prayer in describing the notion of improvisation. 
He compared the tefilat hayahid with the minyan. The latter was ‘the institutional prayer of 
the collective’ (2007, 6), framed by text or convention, and maintaining ‘a positive 
“homecoming” attitude’ (2007, 8). Ilan warned here that ‘as so often happens with love, 
happiness and creativity, prayer too, when instrumentalized and institutionalized, negates its 
own essence and becomes a devoted slave of the reality it is committed to transcend’ (2007, 
52). The former, tefilat hayahid, ‘is fundamentally spontaneous and improvisational’ (2007, 
8). But as he points out, the law and improvisation here ‘are very much connected’ (2007, 8). 
‘There is no meaningful improvisation without responsibility, tradition and laws’ (2007, 8). 
Interpretation in Judaism has always maintained this creative tension, and here again Ilan saw 
the possibility of ‘responsible improvisation’ (2007,8) in diasporic life. He even extended the 
idea of improvisation to seeing it as a new ‘deterritorialization in the spirit of Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s religiosity’ (2007, 40).  
Taken to education specifically, improvisation ‘is essentially different from the various 
attempts to transcend all versions of normalizing education, cultural politics, and other 
manifestations of imposed “consensus”’ (2007, 6). Improvisation, for Ilan, was a (co-)poiesis 
which can negatively claim ‘the lost intimacy with the cosmos, with the laws, and with the 
tradition and togetherness’ (2007, 6). Embodying the spirit of openness and possibility that 
was so central to Ilan’s project, and characterizing counter-education and diasporic education, 
improvisation for Ilan was transcendence, for it was ‘a pre-condition, as well as a 
manifestation of genuine creativity’ (2007, 62). 
 
The new anti-semitism 
To counter-education, improvisation and diasporic philosophical education was aligned a 
fourth and perhaps even more powerful current of Ilan’s thinking. When I last met Ilan, on 
his visit to talk to students at the University of Winchester (UK), his overriding concern was 
the idea of the ‘new anti-Semitism’. This was a logical development of his critique of critical 
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pedagogy, and of his notion of diasporic education. If the realm of the self-evident is 
uncritically made the ground of post-modern educational theory, and if a hierarchy of 
knowledge is eschewed in favour of a pluralism or ethnocentrism of the oppressed, then this 
combination becomes the self-evident prejudice against the transcendent, against the 
religiosity of second stage critical theory, and against Judaism itself. Ilan found this new anti-
Semitism in the death of metaphysics 
New anti-Semitism is a total and ironically also universal substitute to the 
Enlightenment’s telos; a transformation of progressivism from a humanist-oriented 
ethos committed to the Enlightenment into a new progressivism that is committed to 
destroy Enlightenment and finds much relevance in the tradition of 18th and 19th 
century counter-Enlightenment, in the proto-Nazi literature and in present new neo-
Marxism and post-structuralist philosophies; an unrestrained ecstatic strive to 
oppose and destroy the essence, the history and the aim of the West and its Judeo-
Christian foundations. (2010, 86) 
 
This amounted to killing God anew each time and, as he said to me, it meant crucifying the 
Jew again and again. Behind the attack on metaphysics, on the transcendent, and on the 
hierarchy of knowledge that leads out of the self-evident, he found an anti-Semitism aimed 
against ‘the Jewish spirit, “Western civilisation” or “colonialism”’ (2010, 87). This anti-
Semitism was ‘directed against (Western) pretentiousness to deliver the word of 
“redemption” or “liberation” in a genuine, just and universally valid manner’(2010, 87) 
believing them to be the foundation of the ‘predatory practices of capitalism, oppression and 
destruction of the Others’ identity’(2010, 87-8), and believing also that the “impetus for this 
Western oppressive drive is the Jew’(2010, 88) and its ‘most extreme, violent and fragile 
representative’(2010, 89) – the state of Israel. 
I think that for Ilan, the hostility he saw in others’ perception of a Jewish agenda, a hostility 
made actual under many different banners, took refuge in the self-evident error of 
transcendence and metaphysics, and in the equally self-evident error of their attendant 
colonialism and imperialism. For Ilan, this conjoining of critical pedagogy and post-structural 
educational theory saw the new progressivism united in ‘the truth of the post-metaphysical 
moment; the exile of the holiness of transcendence or progress in the form of a humanist 
killing of God’(2010, 89). Against the self-evident errors of metaphysics, Ilan warned that 
those who are united in the self-evident critique of the Judeo-Christian tradition ‘are normally 
unaware of the powers manipulating them’(2010, 89), i.e. the powers that ride the wave of 
the new anti-Semitism, in which Israel becomes ‘an icon for all evil’(2010, 90). He noted too 
the inversion that the new anti-Semitism takes. Previously the Jewish spirit was totally other 
to Western civilisation; now it is charged and found guilty of being its essence. This new 
anti-Semitism is a ‘zeitgeist-without-Spirit’ (2010, 92). As with his comments on friends who 
are also critical pedagogues, so Ilan noted that many new progressivists, some of whom were 
his friends and some of whom were Jews, ‘do not see themselves as racists and anti-Semites. 
Many of them are proud anti-racists and are explicitly and consciously against (old) anti-
Semitism. It is quite a challenge for them to face their anti-racist credo as part and parcel of 
the new anti-Semitism’(2010, 93). 
11 
The final publication is available at link.springer.com via https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-017-9582-3. 
 
I can offer two depressing examples of the difficulties that Ilan is alluding to here. Both are 
from within the world of the academic conferences that Ilan attended. The first concerns of 
paper being given on Heidegger. When a member of the audience raised the question of 
Heidegger’s Nazism he was rebuked by the chair of the session who said we don’t need to 
hear such things. The second, much more poignant, was Ilan’s final contribution to a 
conference he had regularly attended and contributed to. At the end of a paper on religion and 
education, Ilan rose from his position high in the stalls and proceeded in his passionate, 
vulnerable, yet commanding way, to remind us that the heart of these issues concerned the 
struggle for humanity. The love of life that the presenter had successfully suppressed could 
be heard in Ilan’s critique, but he too was cut short by the Chair and told that we didn’t need 
to hear any more from him on this. This was the last contribution I ever saw Ilan make at a 
conference. If it was one in which this new anti-Semitism displayed itself, then in a grotesque 
way, this is a miserable endorsement of Ilan’s own warnings about the new tyranny of the 
self-evident. This Jew, Ilan Gur Ze’ev, became again ‘an acid test to the stance of the 
human’(2010, 103) taken by others. 
 
a final prayer 
I do not want to offer critical comments here on Ilan’s thought and work. My dialogue with 
him was set out in the responses which I wrote to his papers and which he was generous 
enough to publish in two of his edited books. Instead I want to finish by placing Ilan’s work 
within a very specific form of Western and modern self-critique.  
The themes that Ilan worked with were not new, and he never claimed them to be. He worked 
within the aporias of critical theory, aporias which today remain with us and show no sign of 
relenting or releasing their grip on theory and practice. From critical theory we are offered a 
new form of melancholy, to add to the melancholia which has accompanied the self-critique 
of the Western tradition across two and half millennia. The great triumph of modern 
enlightenment reason was its coming to know itself as rational law. Its criterion was that all 
rational beings could bring themselves under their own sovereignty. This sovereignty would 
be the law of this law and its fundamental basis would be the equality of all who are under it.  
But with this advance in the organization of social relations came unforeseen terrors. Not 
only was this law achieved only after much bloodshed of those who stood in its way, but the 
victory rebounded on itself. The reason that declared itself the universality of each rational 
sovereign individual immediately set itself over against each rational sovereign individual. 
This is the process by which instrumental reason – cold, impersonal, calculating, 
bureaucratic, efficient – stands opposed to the ‘human’ – emotive, artistic, creative. In this 
opposition reason stands divided against itself as objective and subjective. This divide is the 
ground of the modern realm of the self-evident. Against this manifestation of the self-evident, 
Horkheimer and Adorno offered the new melancholia of the totality of the dialectic of 
enlightenment. They offered the aporetic rationality of the experience of the self-critique of 
the self-evident. In this rationality, the myth of the irrational was subsumed and grounded 
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within the universality and sovereignty of enlightenment reason. But enlightenment reason 
also had to be self-grounding in its being experienced rationally if it was to be consistent with 
its own truth. In this experience, however, it returned to myth and mere assertion. This is the 
totality of the experience of the self-evident, where the self-evident refers not just to 
manifestly ideological elements, but more importantly to the self-evidence of the reason 
which critiques such ideology. It is reason which is ‘obviously’ most self-evidently true as 
the tool of critique, but when it critiques its own self-evidence, when the self-evident self-
evidently can only repeat its own sovereignty aporetically, what then…? 
This wheel of experience and objective validity turns in such a way seemingly as to offer no 
resolution to its puzzle. This, I think, is the ground of Ilan’s work, from counter-education as 
prayer, to diasporic learning, to improvisation, to the critique of anti-Semitism. All of his 
thinking bravely accepts Adorno’s challenge that ‘politics aimed at the formation of a 
reasonable and mature mankind remain under an evil spell as long as they lack a theory that 
takes account of the totality that is false’(Adorno, 1991, 28). The totality of the self-evident 
includes the falsity of the totality. From within this all-pervasive totality a diasporic existence 
will speak of the possibility of the totally other but without pretending to have overcome the 
political conditions of its possibility. When this aporia is replaced by what Ilan called positive 
utopianism then, from within the totality, the denial and the assertion of the totally other 
threaten to become a new fascism of the self-evident. 
It is here, in having a theory of ‘the totality that is false,’ that I believe Ilan is revealed as a 
voice of modern private property relations. Property is so completely the realm of the self-
evident that it is repeatedly ignored by educational theorists. Yet the dialectic of 
enlightenment itself is a shape of modern property relations. In the experience of this aporia – 
for Ilan, ‘the aporia of our age’ (2010, 6) – is the actual experience of the totality of living 
within private property relations. This means that the property relation is actual in the 
subjectivity that experiences freedom aporetically. Private property is never more powerful, 
never more the master of the self-evident, than when the critique of modern social relations is 
made as if private property were not always already the condition of the possibility of both 
subjectivity and its critique. The dismissal of the aporetic nature of the critique of private 
property plays right into its hands, taking such aporetic experience to be self-evidently 
nonsense, irrational, and nugatory. As a result, most critiques of rational instrumentalism and 
global injustice, along with the exile of spirit, the reification of self-evident ‘home’ truths, 
and the new anti-Semitism, proceed without seeing the domination of the self-evidence of 
each of them as always already the actuality of private property. This is where Ilan was so 
brave in taking a stand not only against the self-evident, but also for it, so that its pernicious 
prior mediation would not be erased or avoided. This is how and why he has to work with 
aporias and against his friends. This is what truly makes him an exile from the self-evident: 
that he is prepared to struggle with the self-evident freedom and non-freedom of critique. 
One can hardly be more diasporic than to be an exile from freedom and non-freedom, from 
private property and from its critique, from the self-evident and non-self-evidence of the self-
evident. To his exile, to his struggle, and to the friendship of self and other, I offer my own 
prayer of education. 
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